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ABSTRACT
Major Determinants of Tax Structures in Market Economy Countries
The purpose of the paper is to reexamine the major influences on
the tax structures of market economies, with particular emphasis on
the significance of the level of GNP on the relative reliance on major
forms of taxes. Previous work, primarily developed under International
Monetary Fund auspices, is reviewed. The econometric study summarized
in this paper includes 120 countries, both developing and industrialized,
with data for the most recent year available. The results confirm the
principal findings of the earlier studies but provide more detail by
area. The most firmly established result is that the relative reliance
on customs duties, total indirect taxes, and export duties falls as
per capita GNP rises. Sales and excise taxes, as such, show no
correlation with GNP. In Africa, consisting almost entirely of low
income countries, no inverse correlation of import duties or total
indirect taxes with GNP is found. If openness is included as a variable
and oil exporting countries are segregated, the results are improved
but not basically changed. Countries with a high degree of openness
rely more heavily on import duties, the oil exporting countries more
heavily on income taxes than other countries with similar GNPs per
capita.

MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF TAX STRUCTURES OF MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES*
John F. Due
Professor of Economics, Emeritus
Carrie Meyer
Graduate Assistant in Economics
A question of long standing interest in the field of public
finance is that of influences affecting the relative reliance on par-
ticular forms of taxes by various countries. Of particular interest
is the relationship between relative reliance on various forms of
taxes and per capita GNP. There are a number of obstacles to precise
analysis in the field. Various countries label particular taxes by
different names, and while the International Monetary Fund, the chief
compiler of statistics in the field, attempts to adjust for this, it
is not easy to do so in an entirely satisfactory fashion. In addi-
tion, the figures of GNP per capita are by no means accurate, espe-
cially for developing countries in which subsistence production is
important and data collection limited; even population figures are not
necessarily reliable. Conversion of the figures of each country to a
common denominator, such as the U.S. dollar, involves the use of arti-
ficially set exchange rates and ones which reflect very few exchange
transactions between the countries. Finally, data for regional and
local governments broken down by type of tax are not available for a
number of countries. This analysis is therefore confined to data for
central governments and the states of the federal systems.
The authors are indebted to the College of Commerce and Business
Administration, University of Illinois, for financial assistance for
the study.
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Previous Studies
Several of the studies previously made can be summarized briefly.
Some of the earliest work was that of Harley Hinrichs, stressing
a time series approach, and concluding that beyond the earliest years
of development, relative to per capita income, direct taxes tend to
rise as development continues and indirect taxes fall. More
sophisticated econometric analysis undertaken by Richard Musgrave
2published in his Fiscal Systems showed no significant correlation
between per capita GNP and relative reliance on indirect taxes for the
countries with per capita GNP under $850, but a significant correla-
tion (inverse) for the entire set of countries. The work for the
earlier edition of this book (1970) likewise showed no correlation for
relative reliance on indirect taxes for countries under $500 per capita
GNP and no significant correlation for those under $850. One of the
most thorough earlier studies was that by Raja J. Chelliah. He
concluded from cross section analysis that the share of direct taxes
does not rise with per capita GNP in the lowest income countries, but
rises once a certain level is reached; a positive correlation is found
when the poor or less poor countries are grouped together and when the
developed and less developed countries are considered together. The
A General Theory of Tax Structure Change During Economic Development
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, International Tax Program, 1966).
2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.)
3
John F. Due, Indirect Taxation in Developing Economics (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), chap. 9.
4
"Trends in Taxation in Developing Countries," IMF Staff Papers
,
Vol. 18 (July 1971), pp. 254-327.
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reverse pattern is found with indirect taxes, with no correlation with
GNP in the lower income group, but inverse correlation if the lower and
higher income are considered together.
Most of the more recent work has been undertaken by the staff of
the International Monetary Fund and has appeared in departmental
memoranda of the Fund rather than in published material. A study by
Alan Tait and Barry Eichengreen stressed the per capita levels of
indirect taxes and found these to rise as per captia GNP rises. A
study by Vito Tanzi of tax levels and structures in Africa emphasized
the dominance of indirect taxes, the wide variation among various
countries, and the lack of any trend in the relative reliance on
o
various forms of taxes in the period under consideration.
By far the most significant study is that of Tanzi issued in
31983. The major conclusions are:
1
.
Personal income taxes rise as a percentage of tax revenue as
GNP per capita rises, but with a low correlation (R = 0.25).
2. Corporation income taxes show a higher correlation (R = 0.45)
between the relative reliance on these taxes and per capita GNP within
the group of the developing countries, but the relationship reverses in
the industrialized countries.
Two Alternative Approaches to the International Comparison of
Taxation
,
IMF DM/78/73, July 31, 1978.
2
Taxation in SubSaharan Africa—Statistical Analysis , IMF
DM/81/21, March 13, 1981.
3 Quantitative Characteristics of the Tax Systems of Developing
Countries, IMF DM/ 83/ 79, November 28, 1983.
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3. There is no correlation between relative reliance on domestic
indirect taxes and per capita GNP within the range of the developing
countries. The structure of these taxes varies widely among the
countries.
4. Import duty revenue declines as per capita GNP rises, but
varies directly with the "openness" of the economy, that is, foreign
trade as a percentage of GNP. Export taxes also fall as a percentage
of GNP as income rises, but are very uneven among developing countries.
The Objectives and Structure of this Paper
This paper provides a detailed empirical analysis of the tax
structures of 120 market economies and the influence of per capita GNP,
openness, and the role of agriculture in the economy on the structure.
The nonmarket economies are excluded. The bulk of the paper is
organized according to type of tax and emphasizes the significance of
per capita GNP to the structure. A presentation is made of tabular,
graphical and regression analysis results of each type of tax for all
countries as a whole and for each region studied (i.e., Africa, Asia,
Europe, and the Americas). The major conclusions are restated in an
overview of each region and the robustness of the regression results
by region is noted. Finally, other possible explanatory variables are
discussed.
The following notation and definitions are used throughout:
P123 — income taxes as % of total tax revenue
income related taxes include tax on income, profits and capi-
tal gains, and social security contributions and payroll and
manpower taxes.
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P4 — property tax as % of total tax revenue
P62 — import duties plus misc. international taxes as % of total tax
revenue
Import duties include customs duties and other import charges.
Misc. international includes stamp duties, transit duties,
custom fines and penalties, and exchange taxes.
P51 — sales tax as % of total tax revenue
P52m — excises plus misc. domestic as % of total tax revenue
Misc. domestic includes taxes on services, permits to use
goods and monopoly profit of government enterprises.
Yc — per capita GNP
Ptitx — indirect tax as % of total tax revenue
Indirect tax includes import duties plus misc. international,
sales, and excises plus misc. domestic as described above. It
does not include property tax, export duties or those taxes
classified as misc. taxes (defined below).
P7 — misc. tax as % of total tax revenue
Misc. tax includes mostly stamp taxes and poll taxes.
PI51 — sales tax as % of indirect tax
PI52 — excise tax as % of indirect tax
PI5m — Misc. domestic tax as % of indirect tax
PI5 = PI51 + PI52 + PI5m
PI61 — import duties as % of indirect tax
PI6m — misc. international tax as % of indirect tax
PI52m = PI52 + PI5m
PI61m = PI61 +PI6m
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The major source for the tax data is the Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook Vol. IX, IMF, 1985. 1
Since the data available in the IMF Government: Finance Statistics
Yearbook is not broken down into appropriate subdivisions at the state-
local level, estimates for percentages of state tax derived from the
various types of taxes were made for the following federal countries:
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Switzerland, and
the United States. Information on state taxes from the IMF data was
combined with that from sources specific to each country, which are
listed in references. The percentages found in this way were applied
to the figures for total state tax from the IMF data, so that the total
for each type of tax could be summed for central and state level and
percentages then obtained as a percent of total central and state
taxes. Figures for all other countries reflect only central government
taxation.
It should be recognized that many of the countries included do
receive tax revenues at the local and regional level and in some cases
this is rather substantial, but data are not adequate to allow general
Latest year data were utilized. Of the 120 countries included 1983
data were used for 50 countries, and 1984 and 1982 data for 26 and 17
countries respectively. 1981, 1980 and 1979 data were used for 10, 6,
and 4 countries respectively, 1978 data for Gambia, Nigeria, and Soma-
lia, 1977 data for Grenada and Seychelles, 1976 for Chad and 1975 data
for Gabon.
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inclusion of these revenues. Fifty-five countries listed local or
regional taxes in the IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook .
Income Related Taxes
Income related taxes as defined above are a major source of revenue
for the developed world but much less so in developing countries.
2Simple two variable regressions with per capita GNP (U.S.$) as the
independent variable and income tax as percent of total tax as the
dependent variable show significant positive correlation for all
Eight of those—Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and the Netherlands Antilles have local tax revenue
exceeding twenty percent of central government tax revenue. In the
Scandinavian countries this is almost entirely income tax. In Iceland
it includes income tax, property tax and taxes on commodities and
service taxes among others. In Bolivia it includes mainly commodity
and service taxes and in Ecuador the bulk of the state and local taxes
are listed under the miscellaneous tax category. But many of the
tabulations are not broken down by type of tax.
2
World Bank Atlas
,
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development/the World Bank, 1985, pp. 6-9.
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countries as a group and for each region except Europe, where correla-
tion is positive but insignificant. The results of the analysis are
as follows:
1.6947 0.2603
All countries: 2 P123 = e Yc - R = .38,
(8.549) J (.0001)
1.9043 0.2430
Africa: P123 = e Yc R = .15
(2.646) (.0117)
.7244 0.3748
Asia: PI 23 = e Yc R2 = .56
(5.366) (.0001)
3.8523 0.0231
Europe: P123 = e Yc R2 = .00
(0.229) (.8211)
1.5467 0.2740
Americas: P123 = e Yc R = .25
(3.242) (.0028)
A summary table showing world and regional averages by increasing
income level (Table 1, page 9) supports the regression analysis,
demonstrating a steady increase in percent of total tax revenue from
income tax with increasing income level. Europe shows uniformly
heavy dependence, increasing mildly from 54.5% to 60.5% as income
levels increase. Plots of the data points (appendix Dl) show a more
Significant is used to mean a .05 level of significance or
better.
2
Of the 120 free market economies used in the analysis, 41 are
from Africa, 21 from Europe, 25 from Asia, and 33 from the Americas.
Individual countries are listed in appendix A. For some purposes,
North and South America are kept separate, for others they are combined
3
.
.t-statistic
4
Significance level, half of which is the chance of observing a
t-statistic that large in absolute value if the parameter were
actually equal to zero or of opposite sign.
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Table 1
INCOME RELATED TAXES
Income Related Taxes as % of Total Tax
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
All
Countries Africa Asia Europe
N. & Cen.
America
South
America
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun
.
#
of
Coun
.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
Below 351 24 24.9 18 28.7 5 12.5 — — 1 19.1 — —
351 - 800 20 32.8 10 30.0 5 35.2 — — 3 27.3 2 48.9
801 - 3000 39 38.8 12 42.5 7 37.6 2 54.5 11 34.0 7 36.8
3001-8000 18 57.8 1 59.5 4 68.1 6 60.4 4 48.8 3 50.4
above 8000 19 60.5 — — 4 53.3 13 60.5 2 74.5 — —
Table 2
PROPERTY TAXES
Property Tax as % of Tot al Tax
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
All
Countries Africa Asia Europe
N. & Cen.
America
South
America
//
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun
//
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
//
of
Coun.
Below 351 24 2.0 18 1.9 5 2.5 — — 1 1.4 — —
351 - 800 20 1.2 10 0.8 5 0.8 — — 3 2.3 2 2.8
801 - 3000 39 2.6 12 1.3 7 2.1 2 1.8 11 3.1 7 4.6
3001-8000 18 2.8 1 0.01 4 4.7 6 2.5 4 2.9 3 1.7
above 8000
1
19 2.8 — — 4 3.3 13 2.8 2 1.0 — —
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detailed picture for all countries. Plots by regions are not included
in the appendix, but data for the individual countries is recorded in
appendix A. In Africa income tax as percent of tax revenue ranges
between 6.4 and 71.4% with Somalia as the lowest figure and Congo as
the highest. All but four observations lie between 10 and 60%. In
Asia, Indonesia stands out with a very high income related tax
figure—82.3% at per capita GNP of only $580. Bahrain and Kuwait also
stand out, perhaps because their high per capita income is not
representative of their level of development. The majority of the
observations (all but 4) fall between 10 and 70%. Reliance on income
related taxes in Europe varies between 40 and 75% with the exception
of Iceland at 20.6%. A smooth linear relationship is found in the
western hemisphere ranging from 20% to a high 86.5% in Trinidad and
Tobago.
Property Tax
Property taxes play a very minor role as a source of national/state
tax revenue at all income levels with only Dominica and Singapore
exceeding 10% and the bulk of the countries, all but 7, below 6%. A
study which includes taxes at the local level would give a more repre-
sentative picture of property taxes in general but data are not
available.
Regression analysis gives ambiguous results in all regions of the
world taken separately and a positive relationship in the world as a
whole
:
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-3.5968 0.4508
All countries: P4 = e Yc R^ = .07
(2.866) (.0049)
(See appendix B2 for other results)
Summary Table 2, page 9, and plots of the world picture (appendix
D2) might lead one to posit a U-shaped relationship with highest
levels of property tax at low levels of development and again at much
higher levels. The importance of land tax at low levels of develop-
ment, pointed out by Musgrave could be reflected here as well as more
available tax handles at higher levels of development.
Export Duties
Export duties are shown to be an important source of tax revenue
only at the lowest income levels, especially in Africa and Central
America and the Caribbean (Table 3, page 12), with almost no reliance
on them in Europe and the countries above $3000/pc in Asia and North
and Central America. Africa shows a drop from an average of almost
12% for those countries below $351/pc to appoximately 2.5%, which is
maintained throughout the range of $351-8000/pc . The "all countries"
summary shows a very strong negative relationship between level of
GNP/pc and percent of total tax from export duties.
The plots of the data points for all countries (appendix D3) show
the same strong negative relationship. A more detailed account of
those countries which do rely heavily on export duties for tax revenue
can be found in appendix A. Five countries in Africa exceed 20%
reliance on export duties, including Uganda at 46.6% and Guinea at
1
,Musgrave, R. , Fiscal Systems, op. cit., p. 125.
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Table 3
EXPORT DUTIES
Export Dutie s % of Total Tax
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
All
Countries Africa Asia Europe
N. & Cen.
America
South
America
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
Below 351 24 9.9 18 11.7 5 3.6 — — 1 7.2 — —
351 - 800 20 4.1 10 2.6 5 4.0 — — 3 12.0 2 0.4
801 - 3000 39 3.7 12 2.7 7 2.4 2 0.01 11 6.3 7 3.4
3001-8000 18 1.1 1 2.5 4 0.03 6 0.001 4 0.6 3 4.7
above 8000 19 .03 — 4 0.03 13 0.01 2 0.1 — —
Table 4
TOTAL INDIRECT TAX
Indirect Tax as % of Total Tax
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
All
Countries Africa Asia Europe
N. & Cen.
America
South
America
#
of
Coun
.
#
of
Coun
.
#
of
Coun
.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun
.
of
Coun.
Below 351 24 61.0 18 55.3 5 80.5 — — 1 66.3 —
351 - 800 20 59.6 10 64.8 5 56.0 — — 3 56.6 2 46.7
801 - 3000 39 51.3 12 51.8 7 54.7 2 38.6 11 51.4 7 50.7
3001-8000 18 36.5 1 35.4 4 26.0 6 35.7 4 44.9 3 41.4
above 8000 19 36.4 — — 4 42.2 13 36.4 2 24.3 — —
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37.9%. Six countries in Central and South America fall in the range of
10-22% with Jamaica topping the range at 21.6%. In Asia only three
countries exceed a reliance on export duties of 3%—the Solomon Islands
at 15.6%, Sri Lanka at 13% and Malaysia at 11.8%. In Europe, Norway
and the U.K. top the list hut with only .05% of their tax revenue
coming from export duties, and from the world picture, it
can be seen that all countries with GNP/pc in excess of $5000 maintain
their export duties revenues at less than 1% of total tax revenue.
The regression analysis supports these conclusions, showing a
significant negative relationship in the world as a whole and in all
regions with the exception of Europe, whose reliance on export duties
in uniformly negligible. The results of the analysis are as follows:
R2 = .37
(.0001)
R = .10
(.0486)
R
2
= .27
(.0077)
R
2
= .02
(.5959)
2
Americas: P62 = e Yc R = .32
(.0006)
10.3986 -1.6656
P62 = e Yc
(-8.370)
6.6618 -1.0716
P62 = e Yc
(-2.036)
7.2550 -1.3499
P62 = e Yc
(-2.920)
-8.5819 0.2832
P62 = e Yc
(0.539)
15.0707 -2.0640
(-3.824)
Indirect Taxes
Indirect taxes are major sources of revenue for developing
countries. Of those countries with GNP/pc under $5000 only four
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received less than 30% of their tax revenue from indirect taxes:
Guinea at $3000 - 21.7%, Indonesia at $580 - 15.6%, Congo at $1370 -
26.7% and Venezuela at $4140 - 26.1% (see appendix A).
Regression analysis shows a significant negative relationship
between reliance on indirect taxes and GNP/pc in the world as a whole
and all regions except, once again, Europe, where indirect taxes range
consistently between 25 and 50%. The analysis yields the following
equations
:
All countries: Ptitx = e
Africa:
Asia
:
Europe
:
Americas
:
Ptitx = e
Ptitx = e
Ptitx = e
Ptitx = e
5.0631 -0.1690
Yc
(-7.369)
4.514 -0.0842
Yc
(-1.567)
5.4053 -0.2124
Yc
(-3.336)
4.1707 -0.0704
Yc
(-0.625)
5.7051 -0.2522
Yc
(-3.824) (-3.973)
R = .32
(.0001)
R = .06
(.1252)
R = .33
(.0029)
R = .02
(.5396)
R^ = .34
(.0004)
From the table summary (Table 4, page 12) and individual countries
figures (appendix A), we can see in Africa a generally higher reliance
on indirect taxes—between 45 and 85%—with Lesotho at the top
receiving 84.2% of tax revenue from indirect taxes. In Asia we note an
even heavier concentration in the range of approximately 70% and above,
with Burma at 94.8% and its neighbors, Nepal, India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh, all at approximately 80%, for the highest indirect tax
-15-
percentages in the world. As was noted earlier with the discussion of
income related taxes, Bahrain and Kuwait stand out with high indirect
taxes at high GNP/pc but their GNP/pc is perhaps not representative of
their level of development. In the Western Hemisphere, only one
country—the Bahamas, at a relatively high GNP/pc of $3830—exceeds a
70% reliance on indirect taxes. The remainder show a smooth decline
from highs of close to 70% in the low income range to lows of 12.7 in
Trinidad and Tobago and 19.3 in the U.S.
Indirect Taxes—Various Forms
For the various types of indirect taxes as expressed as percent of
total tax revenue and as percent of total indirect tax, the rela-
tionships with increasing GNP/pc are less clear and have more
variation among regions of the world.
Import Duties
Import duties are the most important type of indirect tax in
developing countries and decline in importance as GNP/pc increases.
As a percent of total tax revenue, 11 countries with GNP/pc under
$2500 receive in excess of 45% from import duties, while of those 20
countries with GNP/pc in excess of $7000, onlv Bahrain, Iceland,
Kuwait, and Switzerland have import duties which account for more than
approximately 5% of their total tax receipts with rates of 47.6%,
20.3%, 33.3%, and 6.4% respectively (see appendix D5). Both plots
and summary Table 5.1 (page 17) show a strong negative relationship
Import duties here include misc. international.
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between percent reliance on import duties and level of GNP/pc in
Europe and Asia with the aforementioned exceptions. In Africa the
relationship is more ambiguous since only Gabon exceeds the $3000
GNP/pc range where import duties undergo a considerable drop in impor-
tance. In the Western Hemisphere, there is generally lower reliance
on import duties with most of the countries (even those with GNP/pc of
under $3000) receiving less than 20% of their tax revenue from import
duties.
Regression analysis shows a significant negative relationship
between GNP/pc and percent tax revenue from import duties in the world
as a whole and all regions on the world except Africa, as would be
expected given the prior discussion. The results of the analysis are
as follows:
8.5059 -0.8460
2
All countries: P61m = e Yc R = .33
(-7.692) (.0001)
3.5390 -0.0408
Africa: P61m = e Yc R = .004
(-0.372) (.7117)
5.2215 -0.3169
Asia: P61m = e Yc R2 = .25
(-2.747) (.0115)
19.7178 -2.2537
Europe: P61m = e Yc R - .22
(-2.345) (.0301)
6.1910 -0.4758
Americas: P61m = e Yc R = .19
(-2.678) (.0117)
Import duties also show a general decline as a share of indirect
tax revenue with increasing GNP/pc although here the differences are
-17-
IMPORT DUTIES
Table 5.1
Import Duties as % of Total Tax
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
All
Countries Africa Asia Europe
N. & Cen.
America
South
America
#
of
Coun
.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun
.
Below 351 24 27.8 18 27.3 5 29.6 — — 1 26.7 — —
351 - 800 20 33.6 10 38.7 5 33.3 — — 3 29.7 2 14.8
801 - 3000 39 23.2 12 31.2 7 29.0 2 7.3 11 20.1 7 13.1
3001-8000 18 17.3 1 23.7 4 6.7 6 12.1 4 31.6 3 20.8
above 8000 19 6.5 — — 4 21.8 13 2.4 2 2.0 — —
Table 5.2
Import Duties as % of Indirect Tax
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
All
Countries Africa Asia Europe
N. & Cen.
America
South
America
#
of
Coun
#
of
Coun
.
#
of
Coun
.
//
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun
.
//
of
Coun.
Below 351 24 46.8 18 50.0 5 36.9 — — 1 40.3 — —
351 - 800 20 54.3 10 58.3 5 63.3 — — 3 51.8 2 31.6
801 - 3000 39 44.6 12 58.7 7 54.4 2 19.3 11 38.6 7 26.9
3001-8000 18 46.0 1 66.9 4 34.1 6 31.6 4 65.1 3 57.9
above 8000 19 13.0 — — 4 41.0 13 5.2 2 7.7 — —
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perhaps more regionalized. Africa shows very little correlation, as
shown by either plots or summary table 5.2, with most countries
distributed fairly evenly over a range from 13.4% in Tanzania to a high
of 98.3% in Swaziland with a mean of 55.0%. The regression results for
Africa are ambiguous.
In Asia the relationship is also ambiguous. Regression results
are not significant. Plots and summary table show a fairly even
distribution among the countries with GNP/pc under $3000 around a mean
of 51.9 and a split between the higher GNP/pc countries: Kuwait, Oman
and Bahrain relying on import duties for 62.0%, 77.8%, and 79.8%
respectively, while Singapore, Israel, New Zealand, Japan, and
Australia range between 9 and 26%.
Europe registers a clear negative relationship between share of
import duties in indirect taxes and GNP/pc. Iceland and Switzerland
are the only countries of the 13 in the over $8000 GNP/pc range with a
share greater than 5%, both with shares of 27.2%. The remaining eight
countries in the $801-8000 income levels average 28.5% as a share of
indirect taxes.
In the Western Hemisphere the only two countries in the over $8000
income range, U.S. and Canada, register import duties as a share of
indirect taxes much in excess of the share found in most of Europe at
9.5% and 6.0% respectively, though low as a percentage of the total
tax revenue. The remaining countries in the first four income levels
are fairly evenly distributed about a mean of 40.0%. Of the nine
countries with import duties over 60% of indirect taxes, only Venezuela
has Spanish colonial roots; it has no sales tax.
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Regression analysis shows a significant relationship for Europe
and all countries taken together as follows:
8.0479 -0.6770
All countries: PI61m = e Yc
(-6.426)
Europe
:
20.1523 -2.1832
PI61m = e Yc
(-2.394)
R =
.26
(.0001)
R = .23
(.0272)
The results for the other regions are ambiguous; they are shown in
appendix B5.
Sales Tax
Sales taxes account for 13.2% of total tax revenue on average for
the 120 countries in the sample, ranging roughly, in all regions, bet-
ween and 30%. Although there is some variation in this average
figure among regions (Table 6.0, below) there is no positive or
negative relationship between reliance on sales tax and GNP/pc that one
could discern on the summary table of all countries (Table 6.1, page
21), in the plot of all countries (appendix D 6.1) or that registers as
significant in the regression analysis (appendix B6).
As for the regions individually, in Africa no relationship is
found between reliance on sales tax and GNP/pc but in Asia
Table 6.0
All
Countries Africa Asia Europe N&C Am S Am
Average %
of total All 13.2 12.6 14.1 16.1 11.1 17.2
tax Users 17.4 16.8 20.3 17.8 14.6 20.7
Average %
of indirect All 27.7 23.2 19.3 45.3 25.9 32.9
tax Users 36.5 30.2 34.6 50.1 34.0 39.5
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a significant negative relationship is found and in Europe a close to
significant but positive relationship is found. The results of the
regression analysis are as follows:
1.5523 -0.1714
All countries: P51 = e Yc R = .003
(-0.608) (.5441)
2.2255 -0.3264
Africa: P51 = e Yc R2 = .004
(-0.411) (.6834)
9.5470 -1.5144
Asia: P51 = e Yc R2 =
.20
(-2.413) (.0242)
-14.3579 1.8114
Europe: P51 = e Yc R = .17
(1.956) (.0653)
9.4578 -1.1606
Americas: P51 = e Yc R = .07
(-1.481) (.1487)
The table summaries (6.2-6.6, pages 21-23) and regional plots support
the regression results.
With sufficient theoretical backing, the results might lead one to
posit a U-shaped relationship. This is especially apparent in the plot
of all countries (appendix D 6.1), but could be due strictly to
regional variation.
As a percentage of indirect taxes we find no relationship with
GNP/pc when all countries are taken together. When the regions are
viewed individually: Africa shows no correlation, Asia shows signifi-
cant negative correlation, while America shows a negative correlation
but not significantly so. In Europe, however, we find a positive
relationship. The results of the analysis are as follows:
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SALES TAX
Table 6.1
All
Countries
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
No. Countries
% Total Tax
Revenue from
% Indirect Tax
Revenue from
incl. using tax
Sales Tax Sales Tax
All Users All Users
below 351 24 21 18.3 20.9 28.9 33.0
351-800 20 14 10.4 14.9 18.5 26.4
801-3000 39 30 12.7 16.5 25.6 33.3
3001-8000 18 10 8.8 15.8 24.2 43.6
above 8000 19 16 15.0 17.8 43.4 51.4
Table 6.2
Africa
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
No. Countries
% Total Tax
Revenue from
% Indirect Tax
Revenue from
incl. using tax
Sales Tax Sales Tax
All Users All Users
below 351 18 15 15.3 18.4 27.2 32.6
351-800 10 6 10.2 17.0 15.5 25.8
801-3000 12 9 10.9 14.5 22.7 30.3
3001-8000 1 1 11.3 11.3 31.8 31.8
above 8000 — — — — — —
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SALES TAX
Table 6.3
Asia
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
No. Countries
% Total Tax
Revenue from
% Indirect Tax
Revenue from
incl
.
using tax
Sales Tax Sales Tax
All Users All Users
below 351 5 5 30.5 30.5 37.1 37.1
351-800 5 3 7.1 11.8 15.6 26.0
801-3000 7 3 6.9 16.1 11.0 25.7
3001-8000 4 2 10.1 20.2 30.2 60.4
above 8000 4 1 1.9 7.6 5.6 22.4
Table 6.4
Europe
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
No. Countries
% Total Tax
Revenue from
% Indirect Tax
Revenue from
incl using tax
Sales Tax Sales Tax
All Users All Users
below 351 — — — — — —
351-800 — — — — — —
801-3000 2 2 10.4 10.4 26.6 26.6
3001-8000 6 4 10.3 15.5 30.2 45.3
above 8000 13 13 19.7 19.7 55.2 55.2
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SALES TAX
Table 6.5
N & C
America
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
No. Countries
% Total Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
% Indirect Tax
Revenue from
incl. using tax
Sales Tax
All Users All Users
below 351 1 1 12.3 12.3 18.5 18.5
351-800 3 3 12.6 12.6 22.6 22.6
801-3000 11 9 13.1 16.0 28.7 35.1
3001-8000 4 2 4.6 9.2 14.1 28.2
above 8000 2 2 10.6 10.6 42.7 42.7
Table 6.6
South
America
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
No. Countries
% Total Tax
Revenue from
% Indirect Tax
Revenue from
incl. using tax
Sales Tax Sales Tax
All Users All Users
below 351 — —
351-800 2 2 16.0 16.0 34.4 34.4
801-3000 7 7 21.3 21.3 40.2 40.2
3001-8000 3 1 8.6 25.8 15.0 45.0
above 8000 — — — — — —
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1.0944 -0.0024
2
All countries: PI51 = e Yc R = .000
(-0.009) (.9931)
2.3193 -0.2422
Africa: PI51 = e Yc R2 = .002
(-0.302) (.7642)
8.7469 -1.3019
re
(-2.088) (.0481)
Asia: PI51 = e Yc R2 =
. 16
-13.9234 1.8818
re
(2.022) (.0575)
Europe: PI51 = e Yc R2 =
.18
8.3579 -0.9084
Americas: PI51 = e Yc R = .04
(-1.134) (.2656)
The above relationships are supported by table summaries (6.1-6.6,
pages 21-23) and plots of observations (appendix D 6.2).
Excises
Little can be said about the pattern of excises as a percentage
of tax revenue except that all regions of the world average close to
15% with Asia at the top averaging 16.9% and Africa at the bottom
averaging 12.3%. No significant relation exists in any regions
studied or in all regions taken together between excises as percent of
total tax revenue and GNP/pc although suggestions of a negative re-
lationship are discernable in Europe, Africa and America in table
summaries (7.1, page 25), and regression results (appendix B 7.1). The
plot of all countries taken as a whole (appendix D 7.1) might suggest a
U-shaped relationship, but again this could be purely regional.
Excises here include misc. domestic.
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EXCISES
Table 7.1
Excises as % of Total Tax
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
All
Countries Africa Asia Europe
N. & Cen.
America
South
America
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
Below 351 24 14.9 18 12.7 5 20.4 — — 1 27.3 — —
351 - 800 20 15.6 10 15.9 5 15.6 — — 3 14.3 2 15.9
801 - 3000 39 15.5 12 9.7 7 18.8 2 20.9 11 18.1 7 16.2
3001-8000 18 10.4 1 0.5 4 9.2 6 13.3 4 8.7 3 12.0
above 8000 19 14.7 — — 4 18.5 13 14.3 2 9.5 —
-!
Table 7.2
Excises as % of Indirect Tax
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
All
Countries Africa Asia Europe
N. & Cen.
America
South
America
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun
.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun.
#
of
Coun
.
Below 351 24 24.3 18 22.9 5 25.9 — — 1 41.2 —
J
351 - 800 20 27.2 10 26.2 5 27.1 — — 3 25.6 2 34.0
801 - 3000 39 29.9 12 18.8 7 34.6 2 54.1 11 31.7 7 32.9
3001-8000 18 29.9 1 1.4 4 35.7 6 38.2 4 20.8 3 27.0
above 8000 19 42.3 4 53.3 13 39.7 2 37.6 — —
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As a percentage of indirect taxes, excises do have for all
countries studied taken together a significant positive relationship
with level of GNP/pc. This is clearly shown in the table summary
(7.2, page 25) as well as in the all countries plot (appendix D 7.2).
Regression analysis yields the following equation:
1.8A56 0.1824
All countries: PI52m = e Yc R =
.09
(3.372) (.0010)
Within the various regions regression analysis yields no significant
results, but in Asia and Europe positive and negative coefficients are
picked up respectively (see appendix B 7.2). Summary table 7.2 (page
25) gives the same indications.
Overview and Regional Overviews
The results reported using all 120 countries are in general very
clear. Income related tax as percent of tax revenue exhibits a positive
relation with GNP/pc; export duties, total indirect taxes, and import
duties as percent of tax revenue exhibit a negative relation, all at a
.0001 significance level (no greater accuracy can be reported). Import
duties as percent indirect tax is negatively related to GNP/pc at .0001
significance. Sales tax as a percent indirect tax yields no signifi-
cant relation. Excises as percent indirect tax exhibit a significant
positive relation of significance at .001. Property tax as percent
total tax records a positive relation with GNP/pc and is significant
at a .0049 level of significance. Finally the relations of sales and
excises as a percent of total tax to GNP/pc are unquestionably ambi-
guous when all 120 countries are taken together.
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With the breakdown into various regions, significance is lost due
to the smaller sample sizes and as in the case of Africa, more uniform
GNP/pc levels across the region.
For Africa the most highly significant relationship is the positive
relationship of income related taxes as percent of total tax to GNP/pc.
Export duties show a significant negative relationship to GNP/pc. No
other variables tested showed "significant" correlation.
An attempt was made to separate African countries by colonial heri-
tage in the plots, but this did not prove fruitful. Some confusion is
created because those countries with colonial roots in France and
Belgium have in general a lower GNP/pc than those of English roots.
The following observations were made:
Income - British dominate 30-50% range and the 8-20% range;
French dominate 20-30% range
Property - French have highest property tax in general except for
Egypt and Mauritius which are British but also high
Export - No discernible patterns
Indirect tax - No discernible patterns
Import (P61m) - 7 of 10 countries with import duties accounting for
over 40% of total tax have British roots; however,
so have all 3 countries with under 10% of tax from
indirect taxes
Sales - Of the 9 countries using no sales tax, none were of French
roots, 2 were Belgian, 1 Italian, and 6 British
Excises (P52m) - Of the 17 former French colonies only Tunisia uses
excises for over 17% of its tax revenue. Of the 10
countries using excises for between 17-37% of tax
revenue, 4 are British, 2 Belgian, 1 Italian, and
2 independent.
For Asia income related taxes as percent total tax again exhibit
the most significant relationship (positive) to GNP/pc. Export duties,
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indirect taxes, and import duties as percent total tax showed signif-
icant negative correlation; and sales tax as percent total tax and as
percent indirect tax showed significant negative correlation as well.
The other variables tested were not significantly related to GNP/pc.
In Europe due perhaps to the general high GNP/pc and level of deve-
lopment we see no significant correlation to GNP/pc in exactly those
variables where correlation is most significant in the other regions of
the world, i.e., income related taxes, export, and indirect tax as per-
cent of total tax. Import duties as percent total tax and as percent
indirect tax are significantly negatively related to GNP/pc in any form
of the equation. Likewise sales tax as percent total tax and as per-
cent indirect tax are very close to showing significant positive rela-
tion to level of GNP/pc. Excises as percent total and as percent
indirect tax show a negative but not significant relation to GNP/pc.
As with Asia, the Americas income related taxes as percent total
tax show the most significant (positive) relationship to GNP/pc.
Indirect tax and export duties as percent of total tax can also exhibit
very significant and negative relationships to GNP/pc. Import duties
as percent total tax exhibits a negative and significant relation to
GNP/pc as well. Other variables tested show no significant relation to
GNP/pc.
Other Explanatory Variables
In addition to level of development, another major influence on the
tax structure of a country is its degree of openness. Tanzi , 1983,
emphasizes openness, measured by share of imports in GDP. Including
openness as well as a dummy variable for middle and upper income oil
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exporters as explanatory variables in our equations to explain the
various taxes as percentages of total tax and as percentages of
indirect taxes, we find that openness is indeed significant at the .01
level or better in explaining the percentage reliance on each of the
three categories of indirect taxes (see Table 8.1, p. 30). Openness is
positively related to import duties as a share of total tax and as a
share of indirect taxes and negatively related to sales taxes and
excises, both as shares of total tax and as shares of indirect taxes.
The reliance on income related taxes and import duties as a share of
total taxes as well as import duties as a share of indirect taxes was
found to be significantly higher among the oil exporters. Excise and
sales taxes as shares of total tax, however, were found to be lower
among the oil exporters so that in net, their reliance on indirect
taxes is less. Additionally, reliance on property tax as a percentage
of total tax and sales tax as a percentage of total indirect taxes was
found to be relatively less among oil exporters.
For purposes of comparison, the dependent tax variables regressed
only on GNP/pc with the same reduced set of 111 countries, have been
included here in Table 8.2, p. 31. It can be seen that the explanatory
power of the equations improves substantially for the various indirect
taxes.
A possible proxy for development in place of GNP/pc is the share of
agriculture in GDP. When income related taxes as a share of total tax
are regressed on GNP/pc and again on agriculture as a share of GDP, we
These oil exporters include: Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, Cameroon,
Peru, Congo, Tunisia, Ecuador, Syrian Arab Rep., Malaysia, Mexico,
Venezuela, Gabon, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahrain, Kuwait.
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Table 8.1
World 1.A038 + .2585 oil .2577 .07937
111 Countries P123 = e Yc Op .46
(2.231) (8.493) (1.187)
Significance
(.0001)
-4.1544 - 1.4110 oil .4573 .2242
P4 = e Yc Op .11
(-2.388) (2.955) (0.657) (.0049)
11.7125 + 0.3893 oil -1.6596 -0.4153
P62 = e Yc Op .39
(0.490) (-7.979X-0.906) (.0001)
4.8983 - 0.2196 oil -0.1702 0.0561
Ptitx = e Yc Op
(-2.432) (-7.194) (1.077)
.38
(.0001)
6.7647 + 1.1601 oil -0.9636 0.6695
P61m = e Yc Op
(2.795) (-8.863) (2.795)
.44
(.0001)
6.4716 + 1.3797 oil -0.7934 0.6134
PI61m = e Yc Op
(3.498) (-7.678) (2.694)
.39
(.0001)
5.8852 - 2.3384 oil 0.1377 -1.7392
P51 = e Yc Op .11
(-2.235) (0.502) (2.880) (.0051)
PI51 = e
P52m = e
PI52m = e
5.5921 - 2.1187 oil 0.3078 -1.7953
Yc Op
(1.121X-2.967)(-2.021)
3.6083 - 0.5224
(-2.323)
3.3152 - 0.3027
(-1.498)
0.0540 -0.4281
Yc Op
(0.916) (-3.298)
0.2242 -0.4842
Yc Op
(4.235) (-4.151)
.11
.13
.23
(.0059)
(.0016)
(.0001)
*0p refers to share of imports in GDP, oil is a dummy variable for oil
exports.
2
The sample used here contains 111 of 120 countries used in the rest of
the paper. The Bahamas, Burkina Faso, Dominica, Netherlands Antilles,
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Zimbabwe have
been omitted due to data availability.
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Table 8.2
World 1.6066 .2733
111 Countries P123 = e Yc
(9.029)
-3.3053 .4180
P4 = e Yc
(2.713)
10.4263 -1.6732
P62 = e Yc
(-8.267)
5.0936 -0.1748
Ptitx = e Yc
(-7.394)
8.6074 -0.8728
P61m = e Yc
(-7.728)
8.1190 -0.6972
PI61m = e Yc
(-6.399)
1.0114 -0.0738
P51 = e Yc
(-0.262)
.5230 0.1010
PI51 = e Yc
(0.359)
2.4018 0.0040
P52m = e Yc
(0.065)
1.9133 0.1788
PI52m = e Yc
(3.206)
2
R Significance
.43
(.0001)
.06
(.0077)
.39
(.0001)
.33
(.0001)
.35
(.0001)
.27
(.0001)
.001
(.7938)
.001
(.7206)
.000
(.9482)
.09
(.0018)
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Table 9
2
R Significance
World 1.5539 0.2831
108 Countries P123 = e Yc .45
(9.225) (.0001)
A. 5708 -0.3517
P123 = e Ag .36
(-7.749) (.0001)
1.6830 .2719 -0.0174
P123 = e Yc Ag .45
(3.985) (-0.185) (.0001)
LDCs 1.4358 0.2950
27 Countries P123 = e Yc .04
(1.016) (.3194)
7.1773 -1.0922
P123 = e Ag .22
(-2.652) (.0137)
*Ag refers to share of agriculture in GDP
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o
find that GNP/pc has more explanatory power. (r = .45 as compared to
.36 for agriculture—see Table 9, p. 32). When both variables are
included, agriculture is no longer shown to be significant. If we use
as our sample, however, only those 27 countries with GNP/pc less that
$450 (classified by the World Bank as "low income economies"), it is
found that share of agriculture in GDP has much more explanatory power
than GNP/pc.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented more detailed and current analyses of the
various influences on the tax structures of the market economies,
overall and by region, than the previous studies. The results are not
revolutionary, but substantiate the previous conclusions and provide
greater detail. The group covered includes the industrialized countries
as well as less developed countries, and thus the results are not
entirely comparable with some earlier studies. The most significant
firmly established results indicate a negative relationship of import
duties, total indirect taxes, and export duties with per capita GNP.
Sales taxes and excise taxes show no significant relationship with GNP
per capita. But on a regional basis, for Africa, made up of relatively
low income countries, there is no inverse correlation of import duties
or total indirect taxes to GNP per capita, though there is a positive
one for income related taxes and a negative one for export duties.
Due to data availability we omit Bahamas, Burkina Faso , Dominica,
Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Netherlands Antilles, Seychelles, Solomon
Islands, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Switzerland from the original
sample of 120 countries.
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The inclusion of openness as a variable and the singling out of the
oil exporting countries improve the results but do not alter the
overall pattern in the relation of the various taxes to per capita GNP.
As would be expected, those countries with a greater degree of openness
rely more heavily on import duties. Oil exporters, as a whole, rely
more heavily on income related taxes and import duties. If share of
agriculture in GNP is introduced as a variable, this is found to have
no significance for the results for the overall group, but has greater
explanatory power than per capita GNP for the 27 lowest countries.
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Appendix A
REVENUE FROH VARIOUS TAXES AS A PERCENTABE OF:
TOTAL TAX REVENUE INDIRECT TAX REVENUE
AFRICA !ncoi8e Property laport Sales Excises indirect Export Misc Import Sales Excises
BNPC P123 P4 P6in P51 P52a PTI7X P62 P7 PI61i PI51 PI52i
Chad 60 21.89 0.96 36.49 18.23 5.96 60.65 8.99 7.52 60.16 30.81 9.83
Ethiopia 140 24.67 3.61 17.43 9.66 19.89 46.18 24.80 8.74 37.74 20.92 41.34
Hah 170 25.95 4,05 20.73 22.30 15.71 58.74 2.15 9.11 35.29 37.96 26.74
Zaire 188 37.J1 0.12 16.59 24.96 6.99 48.54 11.75 2.33 34.18 51.42 14.40
Burkina Faso 210 32.84 1.19 41.62 7.66 11.60 68.89 1.83 4.06 68.35 12.56 19.85
Malawi 210 39.07 0.11 24.36 28.65 7.28 60.28 0.00 8.54 40.41 47.53 12.08
Burundi 240 30.27 10.00 25.28 8.80 32.20 57.39 1.71 0.63 43.91 8.30 56.11
Uganda 240 7.06 0.00 20.92 19.99 5.39 46. 31 46.60 3.03 45.17 43.17 11.64
Rwanda 260 25.45 1.24 27.08 0.00 22.46 49.55 22.28 1.57 54.65 0.00 45.33
Tanzania 270 33.23 0.58 8.44 53.82 0.98 63.25 2.67 0.27 13.34 85.09 1.55
Somalia 293 6.43 3.88 59.57 8.00 19.68 79.24 1.50 8.95 75.18 0.00 24.84
Niger 300 32.60 3.51 17.31 34.74 6.71 58.74 4.75 0.39 29.47 59.14 11.42
Guinea 300 40.14 0.07 19.61 1.27 8.79 21.67 37.86 0.25 93.49 5.86 3.65
C African Rep 310 28.97 0.48 28.75 11.19 16.27 56.21 10.46 3.89 51.15 19.91 23.95
Madagascar 320 30.34 2.35 19.06 26.35 16.87 62.27 4.31 1.04 33.61 42.32 27.39
Benin 330 24.60 0.22 59.73 3.28 9.18 72.19 1.69 1.38 82.74 4.54 12.72
Ghana 340 22.65 0.00 18.23 2.46 28.88 49.57 27.74 0.05 36.78 4.96 JO. i6
Togo 350 53.44 1.26 30.58 18.54 3.10 44.22 0.85 8.23 69.15 23.34 7.81
Gasbia 360 18.52 0.00 67.84 0.00 3.80 70.84 10.24 8.39 94.64 0.00 5.36
Sierra Leone 390 29.75 0.00 37.09 0.00 24.79 61.88 5.22 3.15 59.94 8.33 48.36
Kenya 398 32.80 0.08 23.45 27.79 14.37 65.60 0.97 8.55 35.75 42.36 21.91
Sudan 430 19.64 0.27 56.97 0.00 17.59 74.56 4.95 8.59 76.41 0.00 23.59
Mauritania 480 40.09 1.01 34.11 14.99 8.85 57.95 0.63 3.32 58.86 25.87 15.27
Liberia 498 38.92 1.16 30.61 2.51 24.57 57.69 0.09 2.14 53.86 4.35 42.59
Senegal 490 26.64 2.93 26.58 31.94 10.45 68.90 0.63 3.70 38.46 46.36 15.17
Lesotho 518 11.19 0.04 72.96 9.74 1.50 84.20 3.45 1.13 86.65 11.57 1.78
Zambia 640 37.99 0.35 9.47 15.28 36.49 61.23 0.30 0.72 15.47 24.96 59.59
Egypt 670 44.62 2.11 28.66 0.00 16.65 45.31 0.00 7.96 6 o. ij 3.38 36.75
Zimbabwe 850 46.76 0.34 16.67 25.09 10.42 52.18 0.30 0.72 31.95 48.36 19.97
Nigeria 850 68.79 0.00 25.70 0.80 5.49 31.18 0.03 0.00 82.42 0.33 17.61
Morocco 868 26.54 2.59 20.57 29.20 14.09 63.86 1.88 5.92 32.21 45.73 22.36
Caaeroon 8B8 57.75 1.10 15.70 11.10 8.87 34.87 2.54 1.75 45.82 31.33
Botswana 898 44.99 0.17 51.35 2.54 0.77 54.66 0.19 0.88 93.94 4.65 1.41
Ivory Coast 918 24.23 2.33 24.56 21.17 16.18 61.91 11.24 8.38 39.67 34.19 26.13
Swaziland 930 25.53 0.31 72.43 0.00 1.23 73.65 0.05 8.45 98.34 0.30 1.67
Mauritius 1230 15.18 3.34 41.90 7.36 16.18 65.44 15.77 8.28 64.03 11.25 24.72
Congo 1370 71.43 0.09 16.69 9.12 0.87 26.68 0.27 1.53 62.56 34.18 3.26
Tunisia 1380 31.86 2.75 35.30 6.48 21.28 63.06 0.93 1.48 55.98 18.28 33.75
Seychelles 2378 34.39 1.16 47.74 0.00 9.88 57.62 0.42 6.41 82.85 0.38 17.15
South Africa 2650 60.18 1.86 5.28 18.85 12.35 36.48 0.19 1.29 14.47 51.67 33.85
Gabon 4848 59.54 0.01 23.67 11.27 0.48 35.42 2.51 2.52 66.83 31.82 1.36
ASIA
Bangladesh 148 14.84 2.99 39.21 18.20 19.22 76.62 2.79 2.75 51.17 23.75 25.88
Nepal 178 8.56 8.19 35.29 26.93 18.86 81.07 1.90 8.28 43.53 J -• • ui 23.26
Buna 198 5.19 3.00 30.99 57.19 6.63 94.81 0.00 0.88 32.69 60.32 6.99
India 268 17.72 1.12 19.45 20.48 48.99 80.92 0.25 0.00 24.04 25.31 50.65
Sri Lanka 328 16.85 8.33 23.06 29.68 16.30 69.04 13.02 1.56 33.40 42.99 23.61
Pakistan 388 18.83 0.36 39.70 7.49 32.74 79.93 0.B6 0.02 49.67 9.37 40.96
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Appendix A (cont.)
BNPC P123 P4 P61bi P51 P52i PTITX P62 P7 Pliisi PI51 PI52s
Yesien Arab Rep 503 14.79 1.24 56.39 3.00 9.35 65.74 8.00 18.23 35.78 0.83 14.22
Indonesia 5B3 82.31 1.35 4.32 5.99 5.58 15.59 0.75 0.31 25.79 38.42 35.79
Soioion Is 680 36.78 0.00 43.62 0.00 3.25 46.87 15.62 0.73 93.07 0.00 6.93
Thailand 790 23.09 1.55 23.04 21.86 27.13 72.00 2.56 0.81 32.00 38.36 37.64
Philippines 820 22.36 0.86 30.38 15.33 28.35 74.06 8.67 2.04 41.02 28.70 38.28
Papua N Guinea 830 55.89 0.00 25.27 0.00 15.63 48.89 1.39 1.83 61.80 8.38 38.22
Syrian Arab Rep 1680 37.59 3.41 34.99 0.00 15.74 50.73 2.06 6.22 68.97 8.08 31.83
Jordan 1690 16.88 8.58 51.15 0.00 15.47 66.62 0.00 7.93 76.78 8.30 23.22
Malaysia 1870 46.17 0.63 16.05 8.05 15.14 39.24 11.84 2.12 40.98 28.51 33.58
Korea 1910 28.16 0.91 17.89 25.18 28.23 78.29 0.00 0.64 25.45 35.82 48.16
Fiji 1960 56.22 0.31 27.03 0.00 13.74 48.77 1.22 1.49 66.38 0.88 33.78
Israel 5320 60.27 1.98 6.18 27.88 3.17 37.23 0.00 0.52 16.68 74.89 8.51
Singapore 5980 52.54 15.48 7.23 0.00 20.50 27.73 0.00 4.26 26.87 8.88 73.93
Oian 6370 88.48 0.00 9.03 0.00 2.57 11.68 0.30 0.38 77.84 8.88 22.16
New Zealand 7910 71.18 1.30 4.38 12.53 10.34 27.26 •0.12 0.14 16.87 45.96 37.93
Bahrain 9860 37.99 2.42 47.58 0.00 12.32 59.59 0.00 0.08 79.85 3.80 28.17
Japan 10050 71.05 3.70 1.96 0.00 19.37 21.33 0.00 3.92 9.19 8.00 93.31
Australia 11140 60.43 4.72 4.39 7.70 22.06 34.14 0.13 8.58 12.86 22.55 64.62
Kuwait 19610 43.78 2.49 33.33 0.00 20.40 53.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.97
EUROPE
Turkey 1368 56.44 1.78 18.39 6.11 28.66 37.16 88 4.62 27.96 16.44 55.68
Portugal 2468 52.54 1.78 4.38 14.78 21.88 48.87 8 81 5.59 10.73 36.69 52.61
Malta 3798 64.54 2.75 23.87 8.00 8.58 32.37 8 88 8.34 73.74 8.30 26.26
Cyprus 3980 46.83 3.21 24.72 0.00 23.91 48.63 8 88 1.33 50.83 8.88 49.17
Greece 4288 58.92 2.62 3.64 21.45 16.26 41.35 88 5.11 8.80 51.87 39.32
Ireland 5858 52.72 1.88 15.58 20.13 9.85 45.49 8 88 8.80 34.07 44.25 21.65
Spain 5388 74.99 3.89 4.63 5.29 11.68 21.59 8 38 8.33 21.45 24.58 54.18
Italy 6798 72.28 1.73 0.21 14.75 9.47 24.44 8 88 1.56 0.86 68.35 38.75
United Kingdoa 9628 65.63 1.B4 8.38 15.81 16.64 32.45 8 85 8.34 3.30 48.72 51.28
Austria 9798 67.14 1.76 1.47 18.76 9.68 29.92 8 84 1.14 4.91 62.78
Belgiuis 10488 72.58 1.93 8.81 17.90 7.52 25.42 8 88 8.87 0.84 78.42 29.58
Netherlands 18798 73.58 1.99 8.00 14.98 9.17 24.86 8 80 8.45 8.88 61.93 38.11
Finland 18868 41.86 3.16 1.41 27.28 26.87 54.69 8 88 8.29 2.58 49.73 47.67
France 11548 66.77 1.98 0.03 22.92 B.28 31.15 8 88 8.17 8.18 73.58 26.32
Iceland 12118 28.67 4.58 20.27 33.77 28.54 74.58 3 04 8.21 27.18 45.28 27.54
Gernany 12380 72.96 1.62 0.02 18.15 15.26 25.42 8 00 8.00 8.38 39.93 68.83
Dennark 12358 47.18 3.89 0.98 29.82 19.81 49.73 8 00 8.03 1.81 58.36 39.84
Sweden 13848 65.81 1.59 8.63 18.46 14.22 33.31 8 00 8.18 1.89 55.42 42.69
Luxeabourg 14818 63.38 6.88 8.18 13.15 12.24 25.48 8 00 0.14 8.39 51.61 48.84
Norway 14278 54.83 8.96 8.56 22.44 28.96 43.96 8 05 0.21 1.27 51.85 47.68
Switzerland 16968 69.97 6.63 6.35 11.29 5.76 23.48 08 0.00 27.14 48.25 24.62
NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
Haiti 388 19.89 1.41 26.76 12.26 27.32 66.34 7.15 6.81 48.34 18.48 41.18
Honduras 668 25.65 8.96 28.68 7.75 19.65 56.89 16.29 1.02 51.13 13.82 35.83
El Salvador 788 28.02 5.91 9.19 27.17 19.81 55.36 18.15 8.56 16.68 49.08 34.34
St Vincent 778 36.32 8.88 51.14 2.93 4.23 58.31 1.47 3.91 87.78 5.82 7.25
Nicaragua 868 25.37 5.51 18.93 18.42 38.08 67.36 8.35 1.72 28.10 15.47 56.41
Grenada 948 28.56 2.13 31.25 7.71 12.21 51.17 15.39 10.75 61.07 15.87 23.36
Doainica 948 25.29 17.64 18.97 28.69 5.97 45.62 1.14 18.31 41.58 45.35 13.39
St Lucia 1848 38.11 8.77 37.85 14.83 5.64 57.53 2.16 1.43 64.40 25.78 9.88
Guateiala 1138 27.58 1.01 11.82 24.76 14.88 49.86 6.52 15.83 22.10 49.66 28.24
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BNPC PI 23 P4 P61s P51 P52m pun P62 P7 PI61B PI51 PI 52a
Costa Rica 1153 43.57 0.54 10.81 17.18 14.89 42.88 12.34 0.67 25.21 48,87 34.72
Belize 1160 32.72 1.06 42.70 8.30 11.38 54.08 2. 73 9.35 78.96 0.83 21.84
Jaaaica 1243 38.74 2.03 5.74 23.59 4.09 33.42 21.63 4.19 17.18 73.59 12.24
Doainican Rep 1349 28.96 1.12 33.67 0.00 36.92 67.59 0.78 1.56 45.38 3.38 54.62
Panata 2120 61.07 2.25 12.86 9.38 11.28 32.42 1.71 2.55 37.20 28.81 34.79
Hex i co 2740 32.49 0.05 2.31 16.26 44.56 63.13 4.29 0.84 3.66 25.76 70.58
Bahamas 3830 9.89 3.31 67.37 0.00 12.38 79.75 2.87 4.97 84.48 8.38 15.52
Barbados 3830 48.77 4.89 16.80 16.52 6.71 48.34 8.16 6.16 41.96 41.26 16.76
Neth Antilles 5430 49.84 3.15 34.29, 0.00 12.72 47.01 8.00 0.80 72.94 8.30 27.86
Trinidad/Tobago 6920 86.51 0.26 7.77 1.94 3.02 12.72 0.00 0.51 61.88 15.25 23.74
Canada 11330 70.02 0.36 2.78 13.69 12.66 29.33 0.28 8.01 9.48 46.68 43.85
United States 13160 79.02 1.66 1.16 7.46 6.34 19.31 0.00 0.00 6.31 38.63 31.28
SOUTH AHERICA
Suyana 590 58.49 1.B1 11.65 25.22 9.74 46.63 0.34 0.75 25.08 54.12 20.90
Bolivia 610 47.33 3.78 17.89 6.83 22.88 46.81 0.41 1.66 38.22 14.59 47.17
Peru 1260 20.63 6.19 19.23 30.30 16.39 65.92 6.38 0.89 29.17 45.96 24.86
Coloabia 1420 45.95 0.38 15.70 20.64 9.64 45.99 5.23 2.45 34.14 44.38 20.96
Paraguay 1570 34.92 10.09 16.B2 5.01 28.42 42.23 0.49 12.26 07. DO' 11.86 48.31
Ecuador 1610 56.39 1.97 19.70 12.35 7.94 39.98 1.54 0.42 49.27 30.39 ' 19.86
Argentina 2070 26.65 8.04 6.22 19.75 21.92 47.89 7.69 9.74 12.99 41.24 45.77
Brazil 2170 47.92 0.53 1.77 21.97 24.67 48.41 2.65 0.49 3.66 45.38 50.96
Chile 2190 25.33 5.22 12.54 39.19 12.56 64.28 0.00 5.17 19.51 60.97 19.54
Surinaa 3310 44.62 0.78 30.01 0.00 10.90 40.98 11.87 1.83 73.37 8.03 26.65
Uruguay 3400 33.72 3.54 11.42 25.82 28.08 57.31 2.11 3.32 19.93 45.85 35.04
Venezuela 4140 72. B8 0.83 21.04 0.00 5.06 26.18 0.00 0.19 80.61 8.33 19.39
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Table B.l
2
P123 R Significance
1.6947 0.2603
World PI 23 = e Yc .38
(8.549) (.0001)
1.9043 0.2430
Africa P123 = e Yc .15
(2.646) (.0117)
0.7244 0.3748
Asia P123 - e Yc .56
(5.366) (.0001)
3.8523 0.0231
Europe P123 = e Yc .003
(0.229) (.8211)
1.5467 0.2740
Americas P123 = e Yc .25
(3.242) (.0028)
Table B.2
2
P4 R Significance
-3.5968 0.4508
World P4 = e Yc .07
(2.866) (.0049)
0.8664 -0.3450
Africa P4 = e Yc .01
(-0.664) (.5104)
-3.8699 0.4444
Asia P4 = e Yc .05
(1.088) (.2877)
-0.2347 0.1224
Europe P4 = e Yc .03
(0.768) (.4517)
0.9074 -0.0811
Americas P4 = e Yc .002
(-0.221) (.8262)
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Table B.3
2
P62 R Significance
10.3996 -1.6656
World P62 = e Yc .37
(-8.370) (.0001)
6.6618 -1.0716
Africa P62 = e Yc .10
(-2.036) (.0486)
7.2550 -1.3499
Asia P62 = e Yc .27
(-2.920) (.0077)
-8.5819 0.2832
Europe P62 = e Yc .02
(0.539) (.5959)
15.0707 -2.0640
Americas P62 = e Yc .32
(-3.824) (.0006)
Table B.4
2Ptitx R Significance
5.0632 -0.1690
World Ptitx = e Yc .32
(-7.369) (.0001)
4.5114 -0.0842
Africa Ptitx = e Yc .06
(-1.567) (.1252)
5.4053 -0.2124
Asia Ptitx = e Yc .33
(-3.336) (.0029)
4.1707 -0.0704
Europe Ptitx = e Yc .02
(-0.625) (.5396)
5.7051 -0.2522
Americas Ptitx = e Yc .34
(-3.973) (.0004)
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Table B.5.1
2
P61m Significance
8.5059 -0.8460
World P61m = e Yc .33
(-7.692) (.0001)
3.5390 -0.0408
Africa P61m = e Yc .004
(-0.372) (.7117)
5.2215 -0.3169
Asia P61m = e Yc .25
(-2.747) (.0115)
19.7178 -2.2537
Europe P61ra = e Yc .22
(-2.345) (.0301)
6.1910 -0.4758
Americas P61m = e Yc .19
(-2.678) (.0117)
Table B.5.2
2PI61m R Significance
8.0479 -0.6770
World PI61m = e Yc .26
(-6.426) (.0001)
3.6328 0.0434
Africa PI61m = e Yc .005
(0.457) (.6503)
4.4214 -0.1045
Asia PI61m = e Yc .06
(-1.198) (.2430)
20.1523 -2.1832
Europe PI61m = e Yc .23
(-2.394) (.0272)
5.0911 -0.2236
Americas PI61m = e Yc .05
(-1.307) (.2007)
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Table B.6.1
2
P51 R Significance
1.5523 -0.1714
World P51 = e Yc .003
(-0.608) (.5441)
2.2255 -0.3264
Africa P51 = e Yc .004
(-0.411) (.6834)
9.5470 -1.5144
Asia P51 = e Yc .20
(-2.413) (.0242)
-14.3579 1.8114
Europe P51 = e Yc .17
(1.956) (.0653)
9.4578 -1.1606
Americas P51 = e Yc .07
(-1.481) (.1487)
Table B.6.2
2
PI51 R Significance
1.0944 -0.0024
World PI51 = e Yc .000
(-0.009) (.9931)
2.3193 -0.2422
Africa PI51 = e Yc .002
(-0.302) (.7642)
8.7469 -1.3019
Asia PI51 = e Yc .16
(-2.088) (.0481)
-13.9234 1.8818
Europe PI51 = e Yc .18
(2.022) (.0575)
8.3579 -0.9084
Americas PI51 = e Yc .04
(-1.134) (.2656)
-42-
Appendix B (continued)
Table B.7.1
2
P52m R Significance
2.3035 0.0134
World P52m = e Yc .000
(0.228) (.8201)
4.0937 -0.3270
Africa P52m = e Yc .06
(-1.528) (.1346)
3.1062 -0.0671
Asia P52m = e Yc .02
(-0.650) (.5218)
4.1139 -0.1694
Europe P52m = e Yc .06
(-1.170) (.2565)
4.1173 -0.2144
Americas P52m = e Yc .08
(-1.609) (.1177)
Table B.7.2
PI52m R2 Significance
1.8456 0.1824
World PI52m = e Yc .09
(3.372) (.0010)
4.1875 -0.2428
Africa PI52m = e Yc .04
(-1.194) (.2397)
2.3061 0.1454
Asia PI52m = e Yc .11
(1.661) (.1104)
4.5484 -0.0990
Europe PI52m = e Yc .05
(-0.963) (.3474)
3.0174 0.0379
Americas PI52m = e Yc .004
(0.346) (.7318)
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Appendix Dl
% of total taxes
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Appendix D2
% of total taxes
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Appendix D3
% of total taxes
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Appendix D4
% of total taxes
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Appendix D5.1
% of total taxes
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Appendix D5.2
% of indirect taxes
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Appendix D6.1
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Appendix D6.2
% of indirect taxes
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Appendix D7 .1
% of total taxes
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Appendix D7 .2
% of indirect taxes
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